The Nature of Rhetoric - Dikmans on Historical Performance

# The Nature of Rhetoric ![[rhetoric-and-history.jpg]] An Allegory of Rhetoric and History (French School c.1700) Suadere is Latin for ‘to persuade’ First published: 2002 --- > [!call-out] Classical Rhetoric 101. > > **Primary Rhetoric** (Functional Rhetoric) — the _art of persuasion_ — [[Pathopoeia|aims to produce emotion (pathopoeia)]] and is the core of a communication. This is the main concern of the **Performer as Orator**. > > **Secondary Rhetoric** (Decorative Rhetoric) — the _art of speaking or writing well_ — aims to produce admiration and is concerned with the surface of a communication. > > The **Precepts of Rhetoric** deal with: > - Invention; >- Arrangement; >- Style or Expression; >- Memory; and >- Delivery (Expression). #rhetoric --- > In every discussion, my dear boy, there is one and only one way of beginning if one is to come to a sound conclusion; that is to know what it is that one is discussing; otherwise one is bound entirely to miss the mark. > > Now most people are unaware that they are ignorant of **the essential nature of their subject**, whatever it may be. Believing that they know it, they do not begin their discussion by agreeing about use of terms, with the natural result that as they proceed they fall into self-contradictions and misunderstandings. > > — Plato (427–347 BC): Phaedrus Socrates’ advice to Phaedrus is particularly important to heed when it comes to the subject of rhetoric itself. Studies in ‘musical rhetoric’, in particular, often use the term ‘rhetoric’ loosely or narrowly (by focusing on its technical aspects) and without a full knowledge of its essential nature. As Brian Vickers has noted in the preface to his *In Defence of Rhetoric*, > [!quote] Some people are aware of the importance of rhetoric, but have never bothered to find out how it works, and are content to let someone else do it for them. – Brian Vickers: *In Defence of Rhetoric* (1988) Socrates also tells us that for a speech or a piece of writing to be ‘scientific’ the orator or author ‘must be able to define \[the subject] generically, and having defined it to divide it into its various specific kinds until he reaches the limit of divisibility’ (Plato 2: 100). Let us therefore begin with some definitions followed by various divisions of the subject. [^1] [^1]: The following discussion, as well as drawing on appropriate primary sources, is based on several modern secondary studies. The most important is George A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times* (London: Croom Helm, 1980). This is the only historical study consulted to use the metaphor of three ‘strands’ (technical, sophistic and philosophic) to describe and classify the development of classical rhetoric. It also discusses and uses the concepts of primary and secondary rhetoric. Richard Leo Enos, writing in 1983, recommends this work as ‘the newest, and possibly the most provocative’ of several historical studies in print and states that ‘the early chapters on the Greek and Roman periods have been well received. … Kennedy’s discussion of _letteraturizzazione_ … is important for understanding the relationship between oral and written expression’ (in Horner, *The Present State of Scholarship in Historical and Contemporary Rhetoric* 23-24). The other secondary sources I have used are Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) and Peter France, *Racine’s Rhetoric* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965). The introductions and critical notes included with the translations of the primary sources consulted also provide much useful information. So we first need to define the distinction between the two terms ‘**rhetoric**’ and ‘**oratory**’. In general usage they are virtually synonymous. However, a distinction can be made: - **rhetoric** is taken to mean the theoretical art of speaking, and - **oratory** is its practical application. A ***rhetor*** was originally, at Athens, a public speaker in the *ecclesia*,[^2] what we would call a politician. Later, at Athens and Rome, a _rhetor_ was a teacher of public speaking, a rhetorician; rhetoric was the art they taught. [^2]: The _ecclesia_ was the assembly and sovereign body at Athens, comprising all the adult male citizens over the age of 18, all equally entitled to address the assembly and to vote. --- ## Rhetoric: Generic Definitions Let’s first briefly examine the definitions of ‘**rhetoric**’ in a general reference such as *The Macquarie Dictionary* (3rd edition). It gives five definitions: 1. the art of all specifically literary uses of language in prose or verse, including the figures of speech; 2. the art of prose in general as opposed to to verse; 3. the use of exaggeration or display in speech or writing; 4. (originally) the art of oratory; and 5. (in classical oratory) the art of influencing the thinking of one’s audience. The three definitions it gives of ‘**rhetorical**’ are also worth noting: 1. belonging to or concerned with mere style or effect; 2. having the nature of rhetoric; and 3. over-elaborate, bombastic in style. Several of these definitions reflect a negative view of rhetoric that is commonly held today, a view that has been addressed by a number of writers on rhetoric in recent times: for example, Vickers states that the goal of his *In Defence of Rhetoric* is ‘to remove the misapprehensions and prejudices that still affect our appreciation of rhetoric’ (Vickers: vii). The definitions most relevant to this discussion are - that in the past the term ‘rhetoric’ meant the **art of oratory**, the art of influencing the thinking of one’s audience, and - that something is ‘rhetorical’ if it displays or **has the nature of rhetoric**, that is, if its intention is to influence the thinking of one’s audience. A point I will flesh out later and that features even in these general definitions, is the inclusion of an ‘**audience**’. To narrow our focus somewhat, we can consult a more specialised reference such as *The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature*, which defines rhetoric as the theoretical art of speaking so as to persuade, and notes that it is **oratory reduced to a system which can be taught**. This introduces another point to be fleshed out later: the place of rhetoric in (Greco-Roman and later) **education**. > [!call-out] Rhetoric is a form of communication with a purpose, and that purpose is usually described as persuasion, the desire to affect the thought, actions or emotions of an audience. [^3] [^3]: Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric* 4. Kennedy notes that there is a whole spectrum of purposes, including to convert an audience to a view previously opposed, to implant a conviction not otherwise considered, to deepen the belief in an existing view, to demonstrate the cleverness of the author and to teach or explain. Indeed, almost all communication is rhetorical to varying degrees. [^4] [^4]: Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric* 4. Kennedy gives the example of the difference between the white and yellow pages of the telephone directory. Both use the artistic technique of alphabetization. The white pages are relatively non-rhetorical, the author not seeking to influence the reader to call one number rather than another. The yellow pages, however, are distinctly more rhetorical, seeking to influence the audience by using a variety of devices of emphasis. A modern view, which is consistent with notions of rhetoric held by classical rhetoricians and orators such as Isocrates, Cicero and Quintilian, is that the genus of rhetoric includes dialectic, philosophy, religion, literature, history, economics and even science (Kennedy 3: 284). **Music can also be seen as a species of rhetoric**. It is a commonplace of 17th- and 18th-century music treatises that the musician (composer and performer) should be like an orator. For the musician, theorist and connoisseur of the 17th and much of the 18th centuries, for example, music’s primary function (and its source of pleasure) was to move the affections of the listeners (that is, affect their emotions) and so captivate them (Gordon-Seifert: 374-75). --- ## ‘Traditional’ or ‘Natural’ Rhetoric Rhetoric occurs in all societies and cultures, past and present. In some it is used consciously but has not been conceptualised, in others there are varying degrees of conceptualisation. George Kennedy calls this ‘traditional’ or ‘natural’ rhetoric. [^5] Rhetoricans have done little work on traditional rhetoric in non-Western cultures today, though anthropologists could provide an account of the subject from the large amount of information collected in the many studies of social or political structures and functions in various societies which form part of their discipline (Kennedy 1: 6-7). A highly conceptualised rhetoric is one where it has become a ‘separate discipline with a fully developed theory, its own logical structure, and a corpus of pragmatic handbooks’ (Kennedy 1: 7). This type of rhetoric appears to have evolved only in the West, in the classical Greek and Roman world, where it first appeared in the fifth and fourth centuries BC alongside other forms of conceptualisation, such as philosophy, grammar, logic and poetics (Kennedy 1: 7). [^5]: Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric* 6-7. Kennedy cites examples of the use of unconceptualised oratory today by the Maoris of New Zealand and in the Solomon Islands and Bali. His examples of partially conceptualised rhetoric come from ancient India and China: the Buddha’s advice to his followers about preaching in the sixth century BC, Sanskrit treatises on poetics, writings by and about Confucius from the sixth and fifth centuries BC and a treatise by Han Fei Tzu, *Difficulties in the Way of Persuasion*, from the third century BC. --- ## The Conceptualisation of Rhetoric A theory of rhetoric (or metarhetoric) may be induced or deduced. We have already noted that anthropologists could **induce a theory** of rhetoric as found in a particular society by systematically and objectively describing its traditional practice. [^6] A **deductive theory** of rhetoric is one based on certain principles or concepts which form the basis of a logical system of rules. It is therefore highly conceptualised, using principles from another system of rhetoric or derived from philosophical or psychological assumptions (Kennedy 1: 8). Some classical writers on rhetoric (Plato, for example) believed that it was originally induced from trial-and-error experiment. [^7] However, it is clear to us that classical rhetoric was in fact deduced. Corax and Tisias, traditionally described as the ‘inventors’ of rhetoric, and certain Greek sophists based their oratory on the concept or principle of **argument from probability**, which then became the basis of a detailed and systematic theory. It was this underlying principle that later critics of rhetoric attacked. [^6]: This assumes that the society has been little contaminated by western traditions. See Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric* 8. [^7]: 1. In the *Gorgias*, Socrates describes oratory as ‘a sort of knack gained by experience.’ Plato, *Gorgias* 43. Kennedy notes that this view is more clearly stated by Quintilian in the *Institutio Oratorica* (3.2.3). --- ![[chapter-ornament-2.jpg]] --- # Classical Rhetoric Kennedy has proposed the following general definition: > \[Classical rhetoric] is that theory of discourse developed by the Greeks and Romans of the classical period, applied in both oratory and in literary genres, and taught in schools in antiquity, in the Greek and western Middle Ages, and throughout the Renaissance and early modern period. [^8] This definition is clear in as far as it goes and Kennedy notes that problems do arise when we try to define the characteristic contents of such a theory. [^9] Indeed, the whole of his *Classical Rhetoric* is ‘an attempt to define classical rhetoric and its tradition by examining the various **strands of thought** which are woven together in different ways in different times’ (Kennedy 1: 3). Before discussing these ‘strands’ in more detail, there are some further fundamental concepts relating to classical rhetoric that we must look at. These are the opposing concepts of ‘**primary**’ or ‘**functional**’ rhetoric and ‘**secondary**’ or ‘**decorative**’ rhetoric. [^10] [^8]: Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric* 3. Elsewhere, Kennedy uses the term ‘metarhetoric’, a term coined in recent times to ‘describe a theory or art of rhetoric in contrast to the practice or application of the art in a particular discourse’. Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* 3. [^9]: Kennedy gives the following examples: ‘How does \[classical rhetoric] differ from universal or natural rhetoric anywhere else in the world? At what point in history, if ever, does the rhetoric taught in western schools cease to be “classical” and begin to be predominantly some other, postclassical or modern rhetoric? Is this rhetoric an intellectual faculty, a science of persuasion, an art of speaking well, or a means of literary composition?’. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric* 3. [^10]: The definition of ‘rhetoric’ in *The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary* implies these two opposing concepts: ‘art of persuasive or impressive speaking or writing; language designed to persuade or impress (but perhaps insincere or exaggerated)’. --- ## Primary or Functional Rhetoric Because **classical rhetoric** is ultimately based on the concept of **argument from probability**, it is primarily concerned with **persuasion** (what the French of the neoclassical period called _l’art de persuader_), an end outside itself. It is primarily oral: it is discourse, and, as such, there is no text. **Oratory**, the practical application of rhetoric, is the ‘speech act’, which occurs on a specific occasion to a specific audience. The context is thus usually civic. > [!call-out] The primary function of rhetoric is [[Pathopoeia|to produce emotion (pathopoeia)]]. The orator attempts to move and convince the audience by presenting relevant arguments, but more importantly, by appealing to their emotions. This is a fundamental fact of classical rhetoric throughout its history: in the Greek and Roman periods, in the early Middle Ages, in its revival in renaissance Italy and in the neoclassical period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in France, England and America (Kennedy 1: 4-5) and (France: 24-25). Primary or functional rhetoric is **natural**, **direct** and **simple**, and conceals the presence of an author. These characteristics in combination with the appeal to the emotions suggest a close link of functional rhetoric with what the 17th century knew as the _sublime_. [^11] [^11]: The _sublime_ is not to be confused with what some French theorists called the _style sublime_ (the noble or pompous style) that was one of the three traditional styles of classical rhetoric. France notes that the _style sublime_ ‘may well be dignified without moving the audience. Of course the true _sublime_ may be found in the _style sublime_, but it may equally well be found in the _style simple_’. France, *Racine’s Rhetoric* 25. --- ## Secondary or Decorative Rhetoric Rhetoric is secondary or decorative when used as an end in itself, something set up for our admiration or pleasure. Persuasion is no longer the primary goal: the focus is shifted to narration (what the French of the neoclassical period called _l’art de bien dire_). The speech act is no longer central and is replaced by a text that can be read (and admired) on any occasion by any audience. - Secondary rhetoric is a shift from discourse to literature (including poetry) and the context is no longer civic but personal. - Secondary rhetoric embraces all the techniques and devices of rhetoric when they are used decoratively: for example, the commonplaces, figures of speech and thought, and tropes when used in elaborate writing. - Secondary rhetoric is used to produce the varying patterns of emphasis on the surface of a communication (an important and rhetorically significant function), thus maintaining the interest of the audience and helping to highlight the important points of the communication. Literature, art and music can all be decorated with secondary rhetoric, and, when used excessively, this may be seen as a mannerism of the historical period in which it is produced. Secondary or decorative rhetoric is **artificial**, **indirect** and **ostentatious**, and reveals the presence of an author. Indeed, it allows the author to demonstrate their education, eloquence or skill and make them acceptable to an audience. Secondary rhetoric can be the death of rhetoric in its original sense (the art of persuasion) and is what many people today understand rhetoric to be (that is, insincere or exaggerated speaking or writing designed to impress). It is what critics throughout history have attacked as ‘false’ rhetoric (Kennedy 1: 5) and (France: 24). [^12] [^12]: Peter France describes the conflict or tension between functional and decorative rhetoric in 17th-century France in the following terms: ‘All through the \[17th] century writers are taking up the same position, for nature against art, for a reasonable, natural style against _le Phébus_ or _le style Nervèze_, for simplicity against ostentation, for the Attic against the Asiatic, for Quintilian against Seneca, for the new (classical) against the old (gothic)—there are innumerable ways of describing this conflict. In the defence of simplicity there is an element of modernism, of snobbishness almost, a disdain for popular taste and the taste of the previous generation.’ France, *Racine’s Rhetoric* 24. --- ## Table 1: Primary and Secondary Rhetoric Table 1 summarises the preceding discussion in the form of two opposing poles or extremes. You should remember, however, that such a dichotomy is artificial and that good rhetoric (like good taste) will have a mixture of the two. [^13] | Primary Rhetoric | Secondary Rhetoric | | ---------------- | ------------------ | | _L’art de persuader_ | _L’art de bien dire_ | | Concerned with **persuasion** (an end outside itself: to overpower the audience) | Concerned with **narration** (an end in itself: to speak or write well or agreeably) | | Aims to produce **emotion**: to move or to convince | Aims to produce **admiration**: to please or to impress | | **Oral discourse**: the speech act | **Written discourse**: literature and poetry | | **Civic** context | **Personal** context | | The **core** of a communication | The **surface** of a communication (patterns of emphasis) | | **Natural, direct** and **simple** (sublime) | **Artificial, indirect** and **ostentatious** (mannerism) | | **Conceals** the author | **Reveals** the author (education, eloquence and skill) | [^13]: France makes the following observation: ‘It should not be thought however that the natural desire for a certain degree of pomp and decoration in speech and literature—as in many fields—was in the seventeenth century a shameful inclination which all authors, painters and architects did their best to hide from themselves and others. Although Reason was an official favourite and ‘le passage du Rhin’ preferred to ‘le merveilleux passage du Rhin’, one has only to look at pictures and descriptions of stage sets for the opera, _divertissements_ at Versailles or indeed at Versailles itself to see that bare Reason was not enough and must be elevated and decorated—though not to the point of ridiculous affectation, ‘rich not gaudy’. What constituted ‘gaudiness’ was a matter of individual taste.’ France, I 28-29. --- ## *Letteraturizzazione*: the move from Primary to Secondary Rhetoric Kennedy calls the tendency of rhetoric to move from primary to secondary forms ***letteraturizzazione*** (‘literaturisation’) and states that it is a persistent characteristic of classical rhetoric in almost all phases of its history (Kennedy 1: 5). It is important to note that Kennedy does not consider the _letteraturizzazione_ of rhetoric a characteristic of the 17th century. In 17th-century France, for example, the move towards **neoclassicism** can be seen as a move back to an emphasis on primary rhetoric in reaction to late renaissance mannerism. There are two reasons for the phenomenon of _letteraturizzazione_. - The main reason is the place of rhetoric in education, where the emphasis was on teaching the more accessible technical aspects of rhetoric (the parts of a speech, commomplaces, figures, tropes and so forth) to children by rote. [^14] - The other reason is the lack of practical opportunities in certain periods, usually because of the political situation, to use primary rhetoric in its civic context. _Letteraturizzazione_ is not a characteristic of the neoclassical period (seventeenth century) because public speaking re-emerged as a major force in church and state (Kennedy 1: 5). [^14]: In his discussion of classical rhetoric in the Renaissance, Kennedy makes the following point: ‘It must be stressed that students of rhetoric in the Renaissance were largely young boys…Thus a typical rhetorical treatise aimed at being simple, clear, and capable of rote memorization…We have already seen that \[George] Trebizond thought style \[which deals with figures of speech and tropes and is a manifestation of secondary rhetoric], as contrasted with invention, was a subject the young could understand.’ Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric* 204. --- ## The Three Strands of Classical Rhetoric The metaphor of **three strands of thought** provides a useful means for describing and classifying the main features of classical rhetoric and hence its nature. It will also be useful in then understanding how rhetoric can be and was applied to other arts such as music. The strands can be treated under the following headings: - technical rhetoric, - sophistic rhetoric, - philosophical rhetoric. Each strand places emphasis on different aspects of rhetoric and they can to some extent be related to the three factors or elements – first identified by Aristotle – in the speech situation: - the speech itself, - the speaker, - the audience; and the three species or types of rhetorical speech: - judicial (forensic) - epideictic (ceremonial or demonstrative), - deliberative (political).[^15] > [!call-out] By the end of antiquity classical rhetoric was a standard body of knowledge, which, once fully developed, remained essentially unaltered. It was, however, constantly revised and adapted, and often made more detailed. Each strand made its distinctive contribution to this development and at different stages more, or less, emphasis was placed on each strand. [^15]: **Judicial (forensic) rhetoric** concerns the past. It’s typically used in law courts and involves accusations and defences. The orator aims to persuade the audience about the justice or injustice of an action that already occurred. **Epideitic (Ceremonial/Demonstrative) rhetoric** is mainly concerned with the present. It’s often used in ceremonies such as weddings, funerals (eulogy) or award ceremonies. The orator aims to praise or blame, to celebrate or condemn and so influence the audience’s opinions or values about a person, event or idea. **Deliberative (Political) rhetoric** concerns the future. It’s commonly used in political or legislative settings. The orator aims to persuade the audience to take or not take a certain action, or to convince them that a proposed policy will be beneficial or detrimental. --- ![[chapter-ornament-2.jpg]] --- # The Precepts of Classical Rhetoric The insights (or ‘rules’) of classical rhetoric were deduced from the concept or principle of argument from probability by the Greeks in the fifth and fourth centuries BC and later developed by the Romans. Peter France notes that ‘\[t]he aim of rhetoric is to make persuasion easier by providing a body of time-honoured rules; these rules are not arbitrary but a codification of ‘nature’, of the natural means of persuasion’ (France: 16). In its fully developed form (as in the works of Cicero and Quintilian), the theory of classical rhetoric was divided into five parts that taught how to plan and deliver a speech: 1. **Invention** (Gk. _heuresis_, Lat. _inventio_) 2. **Arrangement** (Gk. _taxis_, Lat. _dispositio_) 3. **Style** or **Expression** (Gk. _lexis_, Lat. _elocutio_) \[Vickers calls this ‘expressivity’] 4. **Memory** 5. **Delivery** (Lat. _pronuntiatio_ or _actio_) --- ## 1. Invention: What to Say There are two tasks involved in invention: 1. to identify the question(s) to be answered (in Latin called the _stasis_ of the speech), and 2. to identify the available means of persuasion (Aristotle uses the term _pisteis_). > [!nb] For the application of _stasis_ to music see Daniel Harrison, ‘Rhetoric and fugue: an analytical application’, _Music Theory Spectrum_ 12.1 (1990): 1-42. This is one of the only accounts in the musical literature to deal with music and rhetoric using the approach argued here. It is concerned with analysis rather than performance practice. Aristotle divided the means of persuasion into two types: **non-artistic or extrinsic** and **artistic or intrinsic**. This division, and the subdivisions to be described below, became a standard part of classical rhetoric. ### Non-artistic means of persuasion These are those means dictated by circumstance. Because they pre-exist, they are not created by orators but are exploited by them. They include laws, witnesses, contracts, evidence of slaves and oaths. ### Artistic means of persuasion These are those means created by orators and are divided into three types or species: 1. **Logos** (logical argument) comprises the modes (or tools) of persuasion by real or apparent demonstration. They are different from the strict, logical and detailed reasoning of dialectic (non-specialist audiences—non-philosophers—were considered unable to follow such reasoning), but involve informal reasoning that is more easily understood. The modes of logical persuasion include the example, the maxim and the enthymeme (the syllogism of probability). 2. **Ethos** (the speaker’s character) deals with the way speakers (or writers) present themselves, apparently unintentionally, as good and trustworthy people who are consequently more likely to be believed. 3. **Pathos** (the emotion a speaker can awaken in the souls of the audience) deals with persuasion derived from appeals to the emotions of the audience. Peter France, in discussing rhetoric in 17th-century France, offers an apt summary of the use of **pathos**: > A knowledge of the passions as they are described in Aristotelian or Cartesian psychology is useful in two ways; first, to enable the orator to describe passions in the course of his narration, and secondly, **to arouse the passions** of his audience, so as to sway them in his favour. This is done largely by **displaying** or **simulating** these **passions** oneself, and **this in turn depends on the figures** which are described in the third section, _elocutio_ \[my emphasis] (France: 17). > [!nb] See Geminani’s discussion of the passions that can be aroused by various ornaments (‘figures’) and the different ways they can be expressed (performed) in [An Introduction to Good Taste in Musick](http://earlymusic.dikmans.net/quotations-about-historically-informed-performance/#introduction-to-good-taste-in-musick). Because orators use informal reasoning, many of their proofs (arguments) will be based on **‘topics’** (Gk. _topoi_, Lat. _loci_),[^16] in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France called the _lieux communes_ or _lieux oratoires_. These are general arguments or lines of reasoning applicable to all subjects that the orator can adapt to the question at issue and then amplify. They include ethical and political premises that can be used in enthymemes, logical strategies (such as arguing from cause to effect) and techniques of amplification (such as by division and definition). Some topics can be used to gain the trust or the interest of an audience. > [!nb] See George J. Buelow, ‘The _Loci Topici_ and Affect in late baroque Music—Heinichen’s practical Demonstration’, *Music Review* 27 (1966): 161-176; and Daniel Harrison’s article (mentioned above). [^16]: In the glossary to his translation of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, Kennedy defines *topos* as ‘topic; a mental “place” where an argument can be found or the argument itself; a form or strategy of argument usable in demonstrating propositions on any subject, to be distinguished from an *idion*, which is a proposition specific to some body of knowledge.’ Kennedy, *Aristotle On Rhetoric* 320. --- ## 2. Arrangement: How to Organise What You Say Arrangement deals with how to arrange one’s material in a logical, and therefore easily comprehensible and persuasive, order. It teaches how to organise a speech into parts and sometimes also deals with the ordering of the arguments themselves. There are four basic divisions (some treatises / handbooks / rhetoricians give more subdivisions, e.g. subdividing the proof), each of which has its own function and characteristics (style). The four part division was usually associated with judicial oratory. > [!nb] See Patricia Ranum’s work on this with regard to French airs: > > 1. Patricia M. Ranum, ‘Do French dance songs obey the rules of rhetoric?’, *Fluting and Dancing, Articles and Reminiscences for Betty Bang Mather*, ed. David Lasocki, (New York: McGinnis & Marx, 1992): 104-130; > > 2. Patricia Ranum, ‘Audible rhetoric and mute rhetoric: the 17th-century French sarabande’, *Early Music* 14.1 (1986): 22-39; > > 3. Patricia M. Ranum, ‘Les «caractères» des danses françaises’, *Recherches sur la Musique française classique* 23 (1985): 45-70; > > 4. Patricia M. Ranum, ‘_Tu-Ru-Tu_ and _Tu-Ru-Tu-Tu_: Toward an Understanding of Hotteterre’s Tonguing Syllables’, *The Recorder in the Seventeenth Century,* ed. David Lasocki, (Utrecht: STIMU, 1995): 217-254.] ### (1) Introduction (Gk. _prooimion_, Lat. _exordium_). The subject of the speech is outlined in the introduction. The aim is to capture the interest and goodwill of the audience. \[See Aristotle’s reference comparing the introduction to the preludes played by aulos players in the *Rhetoric*]. It should therefore not be too vehement. The ethos of the orator is also displayed in the introduction. ### (2) Narration (Gk. _diegesis_, Lat. _narratio_). The facts of a case and the background details are presented in the narration of a speech. It should be clear, brief and persuasive. ### (3) Proof (Gk. _pistis_, Lat. _probartio_). In the proof the orator presents the logical arguments in support of their position and also attempts to refute possible counter-arguments. ### (4) Conclusion / Peroration (Gk. _epilogos_, Lat. _peroratio_). The summing up, often divided into a recapitulation and emotional appeal to the audience. As opposed to the introduction, > **the peroration should be passionate, sublime and full of bold figures**, for here the orator, having set out the facts of the case as he wishes it to be seen, must try to sway his audience by appealing to their passions (France: 18). --- ## 3. Style: how to say it (good expression or expressivity) Style deals with how to cast the speech in words (called **diction**) and sentences (called **composition**) appropriate to the occasion and the material (ideas and arguments) to be used. In doing this, orators were taught to understand and exploit periodic structure, prose rhythm and the figures of speech. Kennedy notes that > [i]t is characteristic of classical rhetoric to regard style as a deliberate process of casting subject into language; the same ideas can be expressed in different words with different effect (Kennedy 3: 5). The section devoted to style in treatises/handbooks often also included - precepts on the purity of language (grammar and usage), - a description of the **tropes**, **figures of speech** and **figures of thought** (figures of passion), and - remarks on the **three styles** that correspond to the **three duties of the orator**. France notes that the general aim of style is to enable the orator ‘to speak correctly and agreeably, since rhetoric is, according to one definition, _l’art de bien dire_’ (France: 18). \[See Cicero? and Quintilian: _bene dicendi_]. By speaking correctly and agreeably, the orator is more likely to move the audience (overpower their resistance). \[See the discussion of secondary rhetoric, which relates directly to style.] ### The four ‘virtues’ of style (Gk. _aretai_). Theophrastus (a pupil of Aristotle) was the first to define what he conceived as the four virtues of style. Discussions of style in later treatises/handbooks were usually organised around these virtues: 1. **correctness** (of grammar and usage) 2. **clarity** (of expression) 3. **ornamentation**: including - (i) **tropes** (substitutions of one word for another, such as the metaphor), - (ii) **figures of speech** (changes in the sound or arrangement of a sequence of words, such as anaphora or asyndeton), and - (iii) **figures of thought** (in which a statement is recast to stress it or achieve audience contact, as in the rhetorical question) 4. **propriety** (appropriateness) > [!call-out] The four virtues correspond almost exactly to 17th- and 18th-century French notions of good taste; see also Quantz (who was influenced by French thought). ### The three styles and the three duties of the orator Three different types or characters of style were generally recognised (some sources give four). They correspond to the three duties of the orator. \[See Cicero and Quintilian]. #### Table 2: The Styles and Duties of the Orator | Styles | Duties | | ---------------------------- | --------------------- | | 1. **plain** / **simple** | to instruct / educate | | 2. **middle** / **mediocre** | to please | | 3. **grand** / **sublime** | to move | --- ## 4. Memory Once a speech was prepared, its main points and their order had to be memorised before it could be delivered. A mnemonic system of backgrounds and images was developed for this purpose. \[See Quintilian]. --- ## 5. Delivery Delivery deals with - (1) **control of the voice** (volume, pitch etc) and - (2) **gesture** (control of eyes and limbs, posture). The best discussion is in Quintilian. Voice and gesture should be appropriate to the style (grand, middle or plain). > [!call-out] In music it is therefore important for the performer to correctly identify the style (character) of the composition. \[See the 3 styles above.] There is a story (in Cicero/Quintilian) about the famous Greek orator Demosthenes, who, when asked what is the most important thing in oratory, replied: ‘First is delivery, second is delivery and third is delivery’. > [!call-out] Most of the treatises by Quantz, C.P.E Bach and L. Mozart are about delivery. > [!nb] See Gordon-Seifert’s call for more work in this area: --- # Bibliography - **Aristotle** (1). *The Art of Rhetoric*. Trans. Hugh C. Lawson-Tancred. London: Penguin, 1991. - **Aristotle** (2). *Aristotle On Rhetoric: a Theory of Civic Discourse*. Trans. George A. Kennedy. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. - **France, Peter**. *Racine’s Rhetoric*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965. - **Gordon-Seifert, Catherine Elizabeth**. *The Language of Music in France: Rhetoric as a Basis for Expression in Michel Lambert’s Les airs de Monsieur Lambert (1669) and Benigne de Bacilly’s Les trois livres d’airs (1668)*. Diss. Uni. of Michigan, 1994. Ann Arbor: UMI, 1994. 9423190. - **Horner, Winifred Bryan**, ed. *The Present State of Scholarship in Historical and Contemporary Rhetoric*. Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1983. - **Howatson, M. C.** *The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature*. 2nd ed. Oxford: OUP, 1997. - **Kennedy** (1), **George A**. *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times*. London: Croom Helm, 1980. - **Kennedy** (2), **George A**., trans. *Aristotle On Rhetoric: a Theory of Civic Discourse*. By Aristotle. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. - **Kennedy** (3), **George A**. *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. (An extensive rev. and abr. of *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* and *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors*). - **Plato** (1). *Gorgias*. Trans. Walter Hamilton. Revised edition. London: Penguin Books, 1971. - **Plato** (2). *Phaedrus and the Seventh and Eighth Letters*. Trans. Walter Hamilton. London: Penguin, 1973. - **Vickers, Brian**. *In Defence of Rhetoric*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. --- > [!link] Related Links > - [[Rhetoric]] (Glossary) > - [[The Performer as Orator]] > - [[Sources of Classical Rhetoric]] --- This page presents some of the PhD research I undertook at The University of Melbourne many years ago. I never submitted a final thesis (I was far more interested in playing), but the research has sustained and inspired me through most of my career as a performer. --- [[AI Use Statement]] © Greg Dikmans. Licensed under [CC BY-NC 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/). [[Rights and Sharing]] Written 2002.